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The University of Houston-Clear Lake established the Research Institute for
Computing and Information systems in 1986 to encourage NASA Johnson Space _
Center and local industry to actively support research in the computing and
information sciences. As- partof this endeavor, UH-Ciear Lake proposed _i : -hi]7
partnership with JSC to jointly define and manage an integrated program of research
in advanced data processing technology needed for JSC's main missions, including
administrative,engineering and science responsibilities. JSC agl'_ and entered ini0 ._ _
a three-year cooperative agreement with UH-Clear Lake beginning in May, 1986, to
jointly plan and execute such research through RICIS. Additionally, under
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16, computing and educatiqnal facilities are shared -_
by the two institutions to conduct the research.
The mission of RICIS is to conduct, coordinate and disseminate research on _-
computing and information systems among researchers, sponsors and users from
UH-Clear Lake, NASA/JSC, and other research organizations. Within UH-Clear
Lake, the mission is being implemented through interdisciplinary involvement of _ i
faculty and students from each of the four schools: Business, Education, Human
Sciences and Humanities, and Natural and Applied Sciences.
Other research organizations are involved via the "gateway" concept. UH-Clear
Lake establishes relationships frith other Unlve_ides and research organizations, i_
having common research interests, to provide additional sources Of expertise to i__
conduct needed research.
A major role of RICIS is to find the best match of sponsors, researchers and
research objectives to advance knowledge in the computing and information -.|_
sciences, working jointly with_NASA/JSC, RiCiS advises on research needs,
recommends principals for conducting the research, provides technical and
administrative support to coordinate the research, and integrates technical results
into the cooperative goals of UH-Clear Lake and NASA/JSC. _ :-
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Security for Safety Critical
Space Borne Systems
Sue LeGrand
SofTech Houston Operations
Abstract
The Space Station contains safety critical computer software Components
in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components
require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of
the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define
requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3
of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA/Johnson Space
Center. _his papmr-_ill summarize those requirements_u%_fnn_l__D,
Introduction
The Tri-Service Software Systems Safety Working_Group composed the following
definition: [3]
Software systems safety is the optimization of systems safety in the
design, development, use and maintenance of software systems and their
integration with safety critical hardware systems in an operational
environment.
At about the same time, an independent task force led by the Software
Engineering Research Center (SERC) at the University of Houston at Clear
Lake (UH-CL) proposed the following definition for use in the research for
the Space Station Program:
Safety critical computer software components are defined as computer
software components (processes, functions, values or program states) whose
inadvertent occurrence, failure to occur when required, occurrence out of
sequence, occurrence in combination with other functions or erroneous value
can result in a hazard or loss of system predictability or control.
Software can be used in the following ways to safely control a system:
Autonomous control
Control of potentially hazardous hardware or system components
Management of information requiring immediate operator action
Management of information with which an operator or another
system makes critical decisions.
m
The Space Station is one of the most complex systems yet undertaken. This
increases the risk of a combination of faults that individually may not be a
problem, but combined can cause a serious threat. Safety planning must be
incorporated into the system development effort from the beginning. This
allows technical safety mechanisms to complement and augment rather than
supplant the system design.
An integral part of this safety is security. Control must be left in the
domain of the security staff and the trusted computer system. It should
never be available to the hacker who inadvertently causes damage, the
terrorist who maliciously seeks to cause destruction, or a disgruntled
former staff member who leaves with potentially dangerous knowledge.
Furthermore, software domains should be protected against run away program
components in another domain and should be recoverable at higher layers
within their own domain.
A special multilevel security model must be developed and prototyped that
will fill the safety requirements of the entire Space Station system with
its ground, on-orbit and co-orbit subsystems.
Standards Used
The following standards are recommended for developing a security prototype
for Space Station multilevel security.
OSI Conlnunication Model [8]
The Open Systems Interconnection provides standards for the exchange of
information among systems that are "open" to another for this purpose by
virtue of their mutual use of the applicable standards. A system is a set
of one or more computers, associated software, peripherals, terminals, human
operators, physical processes, information transfer means, etc., that forms
an autonomous whole capable of performing information processing and/or
information transfer.
OSI is concerned with the exchange of information between open systems and
not the internal functioning of each individual open system. The objective
of OSI _s to define a set of standards to enable open systems to cooperate.
It uses a layered architecture for operations such as intersystem
connections, transmission of data and error functions. The OSI model is
mandated for the design of a network operating system for the Space Station
Data Management System. [4]
CAIS-ASystem Interface Model [21]
MIL-STD 1838-A, "CAIS-A", provides specifications for a set of Ada packages
with their intended semantics, which together form the set of common
interfaces for Ada Programming Support Environments (APSEs). This set of
interfaces is known as the Common APSE Interface Set (CAIS). This interface
is designed to promote the source-level portability of Ada programs,
particularly Ada software development tools. The CAIS Model is found in the
specification for the Space Station Data Management System (DMS). [4]
The goal of the CAIS is to promote interoperability and transportability of
Ada software across DoD APSEs. Interoperability is defined as the ability
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of APSEs to exchange database objects and their relationships in forms
usable by tools and user programs without conversion. The DMS
Specifications call for interoperability of information and database
components. Transportability of an APSE tool is defined as the ability of
the tool to be installed on a different Kernel APSE (KAESE); the tool must
perform with the same functionality in both APSEs.
The CAIS Model has entities called objects shown as hierarchical nodes on a
directed graph. The contents, relationships and attributes of nodes are
defined as well as attributes of the relationships.
Th___eeOranqe Book Level B3 Security Requirements [5]
The DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, commonly called the
"Orange Book", provides a metric with which to evaluate the degree of trust
that can be placed in computer systems for the secure processing of
classified and other sensitive information. It designates two types of
privileged access: discretionary and mandatory. Discretionary access
control limits authorized access of objects to named individuals or groups.
Mandatory security protection involves a comparison of the individual's
clearance or authorization for the information and the classification or
sensitivity designation of the information being sought.
A Level B3 trusted computer base (TCB) involves both discretionary and
mandatory access control. It must satisfy the reference monitor
requirements that it mediate all access of subjects to objects, be tamper
proof and be small enough to be subjected to analysis and tests. A security
administrator is supported, audit mechanisms are expanded to signal
security-relevant events, and system recovery procedures are required. The
access controls are said to be dynamic, since they are administered at run
time rather than at Compile time.
The Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
C-_teria (TNI) [6]
The Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TNI) provides a basis for the evaluation of effectiveness of
security controls built into networks and network component products. The
specific security feature, the assurance requirements, and the rating
structure of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria are extended to
networks in part I. In part 2, there is a description of a number of
additional security services that arise in conjunction with networks.
The Clear Lake Mode_ fo__rDynamic Multilevel Security [9]
This model was first presented at the AIAA/ACM/NASA/IEEE Computers in
Aerospace V Conference, October, 1985. It was developed in a program now
called the Software Engineering Research Center at University of Houston at
Clear Lake and sponsored by NASA Headquarters. The Director is Dr. Charles
McKay, who spawned most of the concepts. The model complies with the
philosophies of the Orange Book, TNI, OSI and CAIS-A standards. It contains
attributes about the subjects and objects used in the above standards. The
model emphasizes developing and sustaining integrity of mission and safety
critical components in the target environment rather than the protection of
classified data.
m
Estimated Requirements for Proof-of-Concept PrototTPe
These requirements are based on the Clear Lake Model and reflect
Space Station design and current versions of the above standards.
current
Major SSP Data Manaqement S_stem (DMSL Requirements [4]
The following is a sample of capabilities mentioned in the SSP Definition
Requirements Section 2.3.4 on the Data Management System that
present a challenge to security in this large complex system. This is
especially true in flight safety critical subsystems. There is a question
as to how to verify the authority in each case.
Override capability of automatic systems is required for
authorized onboard and ground crews.
A User Interface Executive must keep track of which user is
linked to which application tool.
A User Interface Language Interpreter must validate that the
user has access to processes and files.
A User Interface Data Base must contain user profiles.
Performance and trend data is to be displayed to those
authorized.
Payload interfaces are to be monitored by those authorized.
Authorized emergency priority messages must be forwarded.
Error performance must be user selectable.
Constraint checking is required.
Con_oand differentiation is to be suitable for managing
operations and protect the system from inadvertent and
unauthorized payload operations.
Potentially hazardous commands shall be identified.
Co_nand, communications and data interfaces shall be
permitted for user operations facility to payload.
Onboard computational resources shall be provided to host
authorized customer-provided software.
Authorized customers shall be allowed to employ data privacy
mechanisms.
Privacy must be assured for scientific or user-proprietary
data.
Customers_must be able to exchange data subject to privacy
constraints. •
Authorized access is required to onboard planning and
_perational support data with change notation/notifi-
cation/approval capabilities built in.
Authorized crew or ground personnel shall be able to
DMS applications software.
Controlled exchange of data between onboard payloads
offered.
Protected onboard mass storage capability for
must be provided.
Report of transmission status for authorized
transfers must be supported.
modify
must be
customer use
customer data
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The customer must be kept informed on the status of the part
of the end-to-end onboard network which he is using.
The transparent transmission, reception, processing,
controlling, storage and distribution of operational
data and conmmnds must be supported but also maintained
by those authorized.
Caution and warning systems must be managed station-wide and
interoperable between international modules and maintained
by those authorized.
The DMS Systems Manager must interact with the Space
Station Information System (SSIS) Network Integration
Manager for security management.
Local and remote access to onboard DMS
databases must be consistent with security and privacy practices.
Authorized onboard processes must be able to obtain or
clear a global name with the SSIS naming authority.
Multiple, concurrent, authorized access to onboard data
shall be provided without interference.
Restricted views of the database must be offered to the users.
Structures are to be provided that allow the user to build
........ his own checks and control processes for security.
An emergency mode fix to operational software or data tables
may be installed onboard with less comprehensive control.
Major Orange Book Requirements
The Trusted Computer Evaluation Criteria ("Orange Book =) lists the following
requirements for level B3 security domain for a trusted computer base (TCB)
that compliment the DMS software specification:
Discretionary access control shall be to define and control
access between named users andnamed objects..
Mandatory access control shall consist of hierarchical
classification levels and non-hierarchical categories.
Sensitivity labels shall be associated with each system
resource.
A subject can read an object at an equal or less security
• level.
A subject can Write to an object at an equal or more security
level.
Storage objects shall be purged before reuse.
The security level of each communication channel shall be
maintained and audited.
All human readable output must be marked at the top and
bottom of the display.
Terminal users must be immediately notified of a change in
security level of their associated objects.
Subjects must be identified before performing any actions.
Authentication data must be protected.
Individual users must be uniquely identified.
Interface between the TCB and user must be by a trusted path.
There must be an audit trail of access to all objects.
Accumulation of event that may indicate an i_ni'nent violation
of security policy must be monitored.
Inlnediate notification must be made when security thresholds
are exceeded.
The domain of the TCB shall be established for its own
execution and must be pr0tec£ed from interference.
The design of the TCB must incorporate significant use of
layering, abstraction and data hiding.
The security system must be periodically validated.
A Security Administrator must be identified and his actions
be auditable.
Formal and informal models of security policy must be
maintained.
A configuration management plan must be maintained.
A user's guide must be established and maintained.
A design document must be maintained that describes the
interfaces of the TCB.
Major Requirements: Clear Lake Model for Dynamic Multilevel Security
The Clear Lake Model is based on LeGrand's access control model for a
distributed, CAIS-conforming system [9]. It has features that answer the
requirements of the DMS Specifications and the Orange Book requirements. It
also complies with the Clear Lake Model for a Network Operating System.
This system uses Network Application Services, Network Information Services
and Network Communication Services which share a common interface and a
common approach to Network Configuration Management Services.. Each set of
services has agents or managers that act on behalf of subjects or control
aspects of objects.
Subject and object nodes, as used in the CAIS Model, would have attributes
that comply with the ISO Reference Model, Orange Book and TNI. Subjects
having physical capability and security privileges access objects through
object managers. The subject attributes would be sent with the request to
access an object. The object attributes would be located with a description
of the object, and the object manager in the object's subsystem would
provide access after making appropriate comparisons.
Attributes of the subject would be provided by the subject's application
software and by the access manager in the subject's subsystem. The
subject's application software would provide the following:
User/User class/Access Identification (ID) _ecognizable
throughout the distributed system.
Logical Reference meaningful to the user and not necessarily
an ID unique throughout the system.
Intent to be compared to the intent under the object's
attributes. _ .....
Object Type where each object wiii be typed just as Ads
elements are typed (record, directory, editor, tape drive, etc.)
Requested Priority
Password as required.
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The access manager in the subject's subsystem verifies the input and
provides the following:
Subject's clearance level.
Subject's subsystem location and device.
Unique ID of Parent Thread-of-Control
Unique Transaction ID
Unique object ID.
Current roles: Capability sets as provided by CAIS (e.g.; user, job,
project librarian).
At the object's subsystem, the following attributes may be associated with
the object node and listed once each:
Unique Object ID
Type determining possible values and legal operations.
Ownership
Lock Management Information
Priority Management Information
Access History, a summary of on-line records plus archives.
Multiple Copy References
Encryption Name, such
allowed.
for distributed copies.
as an algorithm or
Sensitivity Labels for DoD mandatory access control.
public key, if
The unique ID may be composed of network entity ID, network.LAN ID, network
cluster ID, cluster component ID, resource ID, processor ID, and time/date
stamp. This is based on the premise that each single processor can create,
at_most, one object or one transaction during a time/date stamp period. For
each possible subject, this would be listed once:
User/User Class/Access ID
The following may be listed as many times as necessary for each
subject:
Logical Reference, an alias permitted to the subject.
Intent, which establishes access synchronization with users
of a node.
w
Access Capability Requirement, necessary and resulting
privileges provided in CAIS.
Location Restriction, such as secure area requirements.
Password, as required.
Template Restriction allows access to only designated
fields, records, or other subsets of the file.
The CAIS node model shows that up to four instances of the last set of
attributes may be needed. They are:
i. The node itself.
2. The attributes of the node.
3. The relationships of the object node to other nodes.
4. The attributes of the relationships.
For instance, the subject may be able to copy the object but not be allowed
to read the attributes. The subject may be allowed to know that an object
exists but is not able to copy it (e.g., execute).
General Requirements for a Dynamic Multilevel Security Prototype
Support for access control should be physically located in the extended run
time library (XRTL) and execute as privileged code under the control of a
Mission and Safety Critical (MASC) Kernel. It should be developed in a
modular fashion so that no more support than is needed is loaded into a
target.
Fault management should be offered in the XRTL.
preserved in spite of system failures.
Data integrity must be
Access control and constraint checking must be maintained non-stop.
Dynamic redefinition and selection of all data being transferred must
be verified.
also
Security activities must be accomplished with no disruption of DMS services.
Checkpoints are needed for fault tolerance. The mechanism for these must be
secured in all flight safety critical systems.
Deadlock detection and resolution are needed for fault tolerance. This
mechanism should also be secured in all flight safety critical systems.
Security of data must be maintained through out its entire life cycle.
Security labels must be included with all transmitted data and transparent
to the user.
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Devices should be labeled and the label should include the physical
location.
Information and/or control messages
components that are to be transmitted,
possible exposure must be encrypted.
for mission and safety critical
mailed or otherwise subject to
Space Station subsystems must operate autonomously.
necessary must be exchanged.
No more data than
Some secure data must be "invisible" to unauthorized subjects. The CAIS-A
Model provides for such access control.
All access activity (including failed attempts) must be monitored and an
aud/t trail maintained. A decision is needed for each type of security as
to how long this log must be archived and where it should be located. The
CAIS Model provides paths for an audit trail.
The User Interface (UI) Executive is charged with keeping track of which
user is linked to which object and with routing messages or requests. This
concept should be merged with the idea of object managers in the Clear Lake
Model.
The UI Language (UIL) Interpreter must validate UIL statements and that the
user has access to objects. This should also be considered under the aspect
of the object manager.
User interface menus should not be displayed until the user
verified and should only display options and objects which are
legal to the user.
has been
currently
A user profile data file, as identified in the DMS Specification, should
exist in a secure location and contain his access authority information
perhaps in an encrypted form. This information should not be duplicated
outside of the profile. Passwords should be meaningless but pronounceable
and created by the owner.
User-created access controls must be confined to objects owned by that user.
If ownership changes, the access controls must be re-created by the new
owner.
Automatic backup and recovery is not supported by the software installation
system. Restart conventions, including manual identification of a safe
backup point, must be through controlled access.
The DMS shall dynamically manage the redundancy of the DMS network services
and resources and automatically reconfigure for fault tolerance. The same
access control that existed before the fault must be maintained. Changes in
access control data that may have been made during the recovery process must
be dynamically monitored and installed in the reconfigured system.
The security level of any part of the system must be dynamically adjustable
within the multilevel security definition at run time.
Binding of appropriate resources must be dynamically adjustable at run time.
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The entire system or any part must be dynamically extensible at run time.
A transaction (T) or Subtransaction (S) is the smallest group of actions
that can be considered as a unit. Each will succeed or fail as one unit.
The system must be capable of managing distributed, nested transactions
which support:
parallel execution of Ts and Ss
recovery at the T or S level.
For each transaction or subtransaction, an application specified set of
ordered recovery options will be supported.
Each process in a state of execution must have its thread of control
hierarchically accessible by the PCEE. Each process must be able to trace
its ancestry to the root node of the program or query. Each must be able to
identify and query its children processes_
Services and resources of the system must be structured hierarchically and
be sustained as stable interface sets. [14] All recovery procedures must be
performed through these layers. Higher layers can recover from specified
types of failure in lower layers.
Procedures in individual system parts must be capable of calling or sending
messages to each other remotely. Some messages require the semantics of
"send, no wait =. Some messages require the semantics of =remote procedure
call' with a specified approach to orphans and other faults, the third set
of message requirements support the "rendevous" semantics.
For each mission and/or safety critical application process which is
eligible to be executed on some specified set of processing resources,
behavioral predicates will be asserted which produce independent and timely
health and status checks on the progress of the process. When progress is
unacceptable because of problems involving the process, the processor, or
the context of the execution environment, specified recovery actions will be
initiated.
- Comparison _of Requirements and Available Standards/Proposals
The following table lists the recommended features of the proposed security
prototype and sources of these requirements or available implementation
guides.
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Prototype Requirements and Available Standards
Requirement CL Model CAIS-A Orange Book DMS Spec. OSI
Access history
Agents
Audit trail
X X X
X
X X X X
X
I
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Requirement CL Model CAIS-A
Binding of resources
(dynamic) x
CAIS, OSI binding x
Capability
attributes x x
Checkpoints x
Classify subject &
object x x
Commnd/request
messages interop, x
Compare subject,
object attributes x x
Configuration Mgt. x
Constraint check x
Data display to
authorized x
Date, time stamp x
Deadlock detection
and resolution x
Device Label x x
Discretionary
access x x
Emergency mode fix
Encryption name x
Extensibility
(dynamic) x
Fault tolerance x
Firewalling x
Formal model
Info/DB component
interop, x x
Informal model
Interface document, x
Label export x
Label integrity x x
Label output x
Layered recovery x
Mandatory Access x x :
Monitor events x
Multi-copy ref. x
Multilevel security
(dynamic) x
Nested transactions
(distributed) x
Network security x
Notify user
Non-stop perform, x
Object managers x x
Object type x x
Objects hierarchy x x
Orange Book
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
DMS Spec.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
OSI
x
11
Requirement
Object reuse
OSI communication
Override automatic
systems
Password x
Periodic validation x
Pools of processes
and processors x
Prioritized message x
Protect mass stores x
Protect TCB x
Read up x
Reconfiguration
(dynamic) x
Redundancy mgt.
(dynamic) x
Remote procedure
call x
Remote task
rendevous x
Restart conventions x
Security admlnis- x
trator
Send, no wait x
Simulations x
Single site image x
Software (multi-
version, fault
tolerant) x
Stable storage x
Sys. documentation x
Sys. monitor x
TCB domain
Template
restriction x
Threads of control
(hierarchical) x
Trusted path
Unique device ID x
Unique location ID x
Unique subject,
transaction,
object IDs x
User IF database x
User IF executive
User IF language
interpreter
User's manual x
User's privacy
mechanisms
User profile x
CL Model
X
CAIS-A Orange Book DMS Spec. OSI
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
x
x
X
X
x
X
X
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Requirement CL Model CAIS-A Orange Book DMS Spec. OSI
Views restricted x
Write down x
X
X
Suggested Further Research and Resources
The following are areas that require more study. An attempt is made
identify sources of information or possible prototypes.
to
The Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) is now available. This document
must be consulted before the prototype is built. Jay Ferguson at the
National Computer Security Center, NSA, has offered to advise us of the
progress of this effort.
A level B3 trusted computer base (TCB) requires a formal model of the
security policy supported by the TCB. J.E_ Heaney, PRC Government
Information Systems, presented a selection criteria for their secure
microcomputer network prototype. [7] None of the formal models studied
supported a network security model, and one must be developed for the
prototype.
A packet switched network must provide a mechanism to encrypt data but not
encrypt packet headers and trailers. One possibility is to encrypt the data
before packetizing.
Simulations will be needed to test the security prototype and the final
security system.
A binding is needed between the OSI Communication Model and CAIS-A. The
CAIS-A design team has stated that communication and network management is
beyond the scope of the CAIS-A Model.
The Clear Lake Model of a NOS calls for rendevous of remote tasks, remote
procedure calls and "sends with no waits." A standard must be defined for
the granularity of security among job, process and task and a means to
enforce the security policy.
A way must be found to verify the location of a subject. Clearance might
depend on the surroundings. Small portable devices are a challenge for
location labels. How can the label be verified every time the device is
moved?
A complete security chain consists of accountability, prevention, detection
and enforcement. All of these can be mostly accomplished with software, but
eventually administration is needed. A prototype plan must include
documented administration rules and procedures.
A dynamic multilevel security model is one of twelve components proposed
for a system interface set of a Portable Common Execution Environment (PCEE)
to provide the proper both mission and safety requirements _ulfillment for
the Space Station. The other eleven components are required for a prototype
that would completely prove security as an important aspect of safety. They
are listed below:
13
Interface features and options for a tailorable run time
support environment.
Software structures which facilitate firewalling, layered
recovery capabilities, dynamic reconfiguration and
extensibility for fault tolerance.
Pools of processes and processors capable of non-stop
operation in a fault tolerant programming environment.
A multiversion, fault tolerant programm/ng capability.
Command language interface between the SISs of the
integration and target environment's PCEE.
System-wide like-cycle-unique identification and history of
all subjects, objects and transactions.
Dynamic, multilevel security in the target and integration
environments (B3 class integrity requirements and beyond).
A message interface supporting comunication among clusters.
Hierarchical run time structure of the threads of control of
each program.
A redundancy management subsystem for safety critical
services and resources.
A stable storage subsystem for each cluster.
A management subsystem for distributed, nested transactions.
su  ry
Safety for the Space Station necessitates security and many more elements.
A means must be found to provide automatic, quick decisions on who or what
is allowed access to flight safety critical applications.
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PROTOTYPE MULTILEVEL SECURE SYSTEM
A minimal configuration for a proof of concept for an end-to-end multilevel
secure system for the major entities of the Space Station Program must be
capable of simultaneously supporting the following demonstrations of
multilevel security enforcement under a variety of work load scenarios:
within the processing of each participating processor,
within the processing of each cluster of parallel processors
interconnected by shared memory or shared bus,
within the processing of each local area network (LAN) with
clusters interconnected by a serial communication media,
within the processing of a wide area network (WAN) which
integrates physically separate LANs in to an end-to-end system.
A fully instrumented, highly reconfigurable test bed for the target
environment is proposed to facilitate this investigation and development.
It will include programs to provide access control management needed to
support the integrity of mission and safety critical components for Orange
Book level B3 and below. It will rely on the existing network, database and
applications management routines in the prototype systems.
The test bed is described by the items below:
i. To achieve this demonstration capability, a minimum configuration is
needed to support:
Three LA_s interconnected by a WAN
Three clusters per LAN
Three processors and associated resources per cluster
2. Specified procedures and guidelines shall permit additions of
clusters per LAN and/or processors per cluster which shall not require:
The system to be stopped,
The operating system to be changed, or
The integrity of the multilevel security (MLS) system to be
compromised.
LANsr
3. Different clusters may be implemented with different instruction
set architectures without loss of:
Binary level interoperability,
Source level transportability, or
MLS integrity among the clusters.
4. Different clusters may have differing perceptions of time without
compromising the system MLS support for mission and safety critical
components.
5. Both objects and transactions may migrate among specified clusters
in the LANs and the WAN without compromising the integrity of the
MLS system.
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6. Both objects and transactions may be replaced among specified clusters
in LANs and the WAN without compromising the integrity of the MLS
system.
Advanced development is required in order to implement the test bed. A
minimum team of four full time, top-level engineers for a period of six
years is needed to provide the input for building the dynamic MLS portion of
the test bed and integrating it to the other eleven components. A
recomended schedule is to pursue the advanced development of the above
items in three phases:
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Items i and 2
Items 3 and 4
Items 5 and 6
Years 1 and 2
Years 3 and 4
Years 5 and 6
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APPENDIX A
ACCESS CONTKOL FOR A SAFETY CRITICAL
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM INTERFACE SET
Sue _eGrand
SofTech, Houston
The Space Station Program (SSP) requires a system chac has many
safety crlclcal resources that must be kept secure. The Space
Scatlon Information System (SSIS) is defined as the integrated
set of space and ground data and information networks which
provide required data and information services to the flight
crew, ground operaclons personnel, and the customer community.
It includes as Its elements not only fllghc element systems such
as the onboard data management, communications and tracking
systems; but also existing and planned Insci_uclonal systems such
as the NASA Commun_caclons System (NASCOM), the Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and the data and communications
networks of the scientific and induscrlal users aud the
international partners. The SSIS is conceived to support the
full range of users in all opera_ions of their subsystems or
experlmencs chac involve data handling, processing and/or storage
regardless of where each user is physically located. [18J
Dr. Dana Rall, Acting Director, SSP Information Systems
Management Division, says thac a user may be a subsystem monitor
(human or automated expert system) in a control system, graduate
student a¢ a university conducting a space located experiment, or
a crewperson correcting a manufacturing process in consultation
with someone in the ground home factory. Through all of these
activlcles on this large, complex, non-stop distributed system,
the safety critical components must be secure. This paper will
discuss the access control of _hese components and how thls flcs
into a plan by the Software Engineering Research Center (SERC)
for developing computer system interface sets (SlSs) for these
systems.
Space Station Safety
The Tri-Servlce Software Systems Safety Working Group composed
the following definition: [3]
Software systems safety is the optimization of systems
safety in the design, development, use and maintenance
of software systems and chelr Incegratlon wlch safety
critical hardware systems in an operational
environment.
Safety critical computer software components are defined as
computer software components (processes, func_ions, values or
program states) whose Inadvertent occurrence, failure co occur
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when required, occurrence ou¢ of sequence, occurrence tn
combination wi_h ocher _un_ions or erroneous value can resul_ in
a hazard or loss of resource pred_ccabili_y or _:onrrol.
Software can be used in =he following ways _o safely control a
system:
Autonomous control
Con=col of pocen_ially hazardous hardware or system
components
Management of information requiring immediate operator
action
Management of lnformacion with which an operator or another
system makes critical decisions
The Space Sta=ion is one of =he mos= complex sys=ems yet
undertaken. This increases the risk of a combina=ion of faults
_ha= individually may no_ be a problem, but combined can cause a
serious threat. Safety planning must be incorporated into the
system developmen_ effort from the beginning. This allows
technical safety mechanisms to complement and augment rather than
supplan_ _he system design.
Space S=atlon Access Control
An integral par= of =his Space Station system safety is access
con=col of critical components. Ic must be considered from =he
very beginning of the sys=em lifecycle and planned _o be
controlled in =he domain of a securi=y staff and a crusted
computer system. Space S_a_ion systems may be characterized in
_he following ways:
Parallel processing within a cluster attached to a local
area network (LAN).
Distributed and parallel processing among groups of LANs.
Distributed and parallel processing among wide area networks
(WANs) of integrated LANs and clusters.
All access granted to users must be monlcored and controlled for
_he appropclace operations, resources and time slices. Access co
safety and mission critical components of _he Space Station
should never be available at any _Ime in the lifecycle _o the
hacker who inadvertently causes damage, _he terrorist who
maliciously seeks _o cause destruc_lon, or a disgruntled former
s_aff member who leaves wi_h potentially dangerous knowledge.
A special mulci-level securi=y model must be developed and
pro_o_yped that will fulfill _he spectrum of safe_y requlremen_s
of the entire Space S_ation system and s_ill permi_ the
fulfillment of _he mission requlremenEs of i_s ground, on-orbit
and co-orbi_ subsystems.
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The Software Engineering _esearch Center (SERC) Model
In 1986 Ada* was deslgnaced as the computer Language of cholce
for the Space Station Progra= (SSP). This was after
recommendations of the ADa Programming Support Environment (APSE)
Beta Test Team. This team composed of members _com NASA/Johnson
Space Center (JSC), Unlversicy of Houston - Clear Lake (UH-CL)
and over 30 partlcipat£ng NASA contractors concurred that Ada was
the most appropriate language Eor the SSP system development and
support. This support is expected to be over d_scr£buted,
heterogeneous host and target systems, will evolve over a 30 year
period and have an Indefinite life cycle. Ada was designed co
provide reduced cost primarily through portability of tools,
software and programmers. From this APSE Beta Test Team effort
grew the Software Engineer£ng Research Center (SERC). It is
located ac UniversLcy of Houston - Clear Lake and sponsored by
NASA. Or. Charles HcKay is Technical Director.
In response co _he strong commitment of NASA to the l£fecycle
support of safety of life and property, a SERC team has proposed
a Clear Lake Model for Computer Systems and Software Safety in a
Portable Common Execution Envlronmen_ (PCEE). This model is
built using the Ada computer language and is meant co provide the
following:
A baseline from which subsequent progress in the appropriate
environments may be made.
An extensible or compactable model which will improve safety
in larger, more complex or smaller; more simple
applications.
A "lessons implied/learned" stimulus and opportunlcy to
develop methodologies and tools which better address
the llfecycle issues of safety. [14]
SSP Computer Environments
The SERC team reports chat the SSP requires three discinct
environments and associated activities. They are:
A host environment where softuare for the target environment
is developed and sustained.
A target environment where the executable versions of the
software developed in she host environment are deployed
and operated.
An integration environment where the configuration of =he
current target environment baseline is controlled.
Functional requirements such as productivicy and phase management
are the primary drivers _n the host environment. Target
environmen_s are strongly influenced by non-functional
requirements such as real time, fault tolerance, power and
capacity constraints.
*Ada is the registered _rademark of the US Government (AJPO).
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The integration environment has been added co the traditional
approach tn order Co facilitate scaling up of small models and
creating more complex models from proven building blocks. This
environment is _he domain of =hose responsible for the rest and
integraclon plans used to interactlvely advance the target
environment baseline wlth approved changes in software emanating
from the host environments. It is used to prove chat safety and
secuclty are considered in each component at all times. This
environment ts also used for con=rolling interactions uith =he
target environment =o maximize safety during emergencies.
Static and Dynamic Viewpoints
Two macroscopic perspectives are useful for underscandlng =he
requirements of the SSP environments. The first is the static
viewpoint =ha= encompasses all host environment system and
software phases of development and support.
The second perspective is a dynamic viewpoint of program
execution and crosses all three environments during all
development and support phases. Ic considers such issues as =he
ability to sustain safety while fulfilling mission requirements.
Related =o this issue is the ability =o assure access con=col of
all safety critical components.
Space STation System Interface Sets
All three SSP environments have requirements for User Interface
Sets (UISs) for human-system interface and System Interface Sets
(SISs) for the interfaces of =he application software and command
language =o =he underlying system software and hardware
resources. The SERC team effort concentrates on the SISs. The
goal is co allow such things as tools, rules, application
sofcuare, rest software and command language scripts co be
developed, acquired and supported on a foundation of virtual
in_erface specifications. This fulfills the SSP requiremen_ of
avoiding dependence on the physical interface specifications of a
parclcular operating system, data management system,
communication system or instruction set archlcec=ure.
Two aids in fulfilling these requirements are the use of Entity
Attrlbute/Relatlonshlp Attribute (EA/RA) models and the concept
of SISs. An EA/RA model is one that represents domains of
interest in:
The objects wichln each domain
Relevant attributes of these objects
Rela=ionshlps among the objects
Relevant attributes of these relationships.
A-4
The objects may be either passive (e.g. daca objects _tch no
thread of execuclon of their own) or acclve (i.e. possess their
own thread of execution). Further more the relationships are"
concex_ sensitive (i.e. "normal" processing vs. "e×cepcion"
processing) and may be between or among:
Acclve objects CO active objects.
Active objects to passive objects.
Passive objects cO passive objects.
An EA/RA model which is available on-line in Che execution
environment can be an enormous aid in concrolling access between
and among such objects. The draft [n_ernaclonal Standards
Organlzacion (ISO) standard, Information Resource Diccionary
System (IRDS) is being scudled by the SERC _eam for this
purpose.[23] This standard defines means co:
Document the environmenc
Halncain an Inventory of Components
Provide a model of the envlronmen_
Suppor_ the operacional aspects of the envlronmenc
llluscrace the interrelationship of components
Document the physical/Ioglcal location of components.
An overall scabilicy for the SlSs is obcained by fulfilling three
requirements. First, from the perspeccive of an all-encompasslng
S_S is a vircual interface sec resulcing from the union of all
abstract specificaclo_s of _he objects designed co be visible ac
chls interface.
Second, from the perspecCive of an Z given object wiChin a
particular SIS, there should be "a formal model in the EA/R6 form
for the proper vlsibilicy among all objects and a grouping of
objects Into discreet se_s wlch associated services and classes
of services.
Third, from the perspective of external objects oucslde each SIS,
a formal model in EA/RA form is needed Co describe external
interfaces _o services and access control of services and
resources.
A Common APSE !ncer_ace Se_ <CAIS)_ has been defined _o describ _
_he Interface in a hose environmenc of all Ada developmen_ cools
and all operaclng systems available co each hos_. The SERC team
recommends the adopclon o_ the CAIS as an excensible baseline for
the SIS of the hose and Integration environments. Ic refle@ts
only the scaclc vlewpolnc o_ Cool builders and admlnlscracors,
but It is an excellent beginning and flcs in as a subset of the
overall SIS.
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A Portable Commoo Execucioa Environment
Throughout the iCerattve, dynamic evolutionarY life cycle of each
system of the SSP, the softuare in various forms, versions or
represencaclons will reside and migrate among the three computer
environments. A portable common execuclon environmen_ (PCEE) is
needed for a solucion co =he challenge of produccivlcy and
support of systems requirements and safety. The proper PCEE
model will facilitate _he management of _he life cycle complexity
of software systems in a similar manner across all _hree
envlronmen=s.
Each unit would have a version of the PCEE that is a stable
interface set described by Ada packages selected from a common
run time library. The Ada languag_ has thls package structure ¢o
provide modularity for just =his klnd of applica=ion. A PCEE is
defined _o consist of:
A set of policies for =he management of services and
resources to be provided to the application programs,
The se_ of management modules to enforce the policies, and
A set of rules for modification and extension.
The framework of the entire PCEE must be flexible enough to be
represented in a number of ways in order to accommodate tailoring
and extension in a large number of implementations. The PCEE
must also support the differing operational requirements of the
three environments. _t should hide underly£ng syscem software
implementatlons ranging from a Eailorable bare operation in a
_arge_ _o a tailorable operating system in a hos_ to a general
purpose run time system that is a c0mbinati0n o_ the first _wo
envi ronmen = s.
I_ is the goal of the SERC team that the PCEE support the
following assertion in regards to safety:
If safety is adequately addressed in the host environmencs
_hroughouc developmen_ and acqulslclon
_hen the support of _hls explicitly addressed set of safety
specifications will be dependen_ upon a run time
envlronmen_ built to:
Monitor the system and detect faults that enter =he
system state vectors as soon as possible.
Firewall their propagation
Analyze their effects
Recover safely. [14]
Each run rime environment must be secured in order to assure thac
the above will always be available. This run time assertion is
dependent upon secure and safe context sensitive access control.
The SERC ream has produced the "Clear Lake Model for Life Cycle
Suppor_ of Computer Systems and Software Safety in the Target and
Integration Environments of the Space Station Program". [14]
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=The effort began by studying the safety issues and the models,
methods and cools currently purported to address these issues.
From this study the ream idencIEied requirements for a "safety
kernel" of key components of an execution environment underlying
a PCEE.
Twelve highly interdependent models of key components In a System
Incer_ace Sec of a PCEE are being investigated and/or developed.
They are:
Interface features and opclons for a tailorable run clme
support envlronmenc.
Software structures which facilitate flrewalling, layered
recovery capabilities, dynamic reconfiguracion and
extensibilicy for Eault tolerance.
Pools of processes and processors capable of non-stop
operation in a fault tolerant environment.
A mulciverslon, fault tolerant programming capability.
Command language interface between the SISs of the
Integraclon and target environments" PCEE.
Syscem-wlde life-cycle-unlque identification and history of
all objects and transacclons.
Dynamic, multilevel securlcy in the target and £ncegraclon
environments (B3 class integrity requirements and
beyond)
A message interface supporting communicacion among clusters.
Hierarchical run time structure of the threads of control of
each program.
A redundancy managemen= subsystem for safety critical
services and resource.s.
A stable s_orage subsystem for each cluster.
A management subsystem for _istributed, nested transactions.
All of the above component models are intended co reside in
safety kernels whlch execute in privileged mode beneath the SIS
of processors part.lcipating in the PCEE. Note also that the
dynamic, multilevel security model is only one of the twelve
components. In other words, security is a means co the end of
simultaneously supporting both mission and safety requirements,
rather than an end in itself.
Space Station Security
The security componen_ of the PCEE is based on a model presented
at the AIAA/ACH/NASA/IEEE Computers in Aerospace V Conference in
October, 1985. [10] It presented a "superset" of building blocks
for enforcing multilevel security in a dLstributed target
environment. Ic is...........based on Subjects accesslng objects. .... Both
the Subjects and objects have attributes, and the method involves
a comparison of these attributes in a dynamically changing,
heterogeneous distributed system. Subjects may be users via
their active process-es;-and the objects may be data, devices and
ocher processes. The system must not only meet immediate
security requirements but must react co current capability
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lim£tactons such as small memory space or d£fferen_ processor
speeds. The software Eor this model is to be written £n Ada, and
the model complies with the Orange Book, Open System
Interconneccion (OSI) and CAIS standards.
Ada is especially suited to the needs of this securlcy model
because £_ £s strongly typed. [ 12] Each objec_ named £n a
program has the traditional attribute of value (constant,
variable) and also the atcribuae of cype. The type attribute
defines the kinds of values and opera_ions allowed to be
associated wi_h che object. The Ada language requires _hat all
objects be typed and enforces this requirement during
compilation. If an untyped objec_ is discovered or If _he wrong
value or operaclon is associated _ith _he object, an error £s
reported. All mus_ be in order before the program is executed.
Any secure resource may be named as an object and only allo_ed
opera_ions associated with each one.
The EA/RA structure of =he PCEE can be used to passively
represent a design s=ruc_ure deplc=ing =he relevant objects,
their rela=ionships and the key attribu=es that must be compared
for access control. Each objec_ embodies =he sol=ware
engineering principles of abstraction, modularity, £nforma=£on
hiding and locallza=ion needed for security enforcement. Further
more the o_llne use of EA/RA structures can be used actively by
_he PCEE processes co enforce safety and integrity constralncs
for access control in the execution environment.
The SSP requires multilevel security of the Orange Book (Trusced
Computer System Evaluation Criteria) Level 3 and below. This
trusted computer base involves bo_h dlscre_ionary and mandatory
access control. It must satisfy _he reference monitor
requirements tha_ i_ mediate all access of subjects _o objects,
be tamperproof, and be small enough _o be subjected to analysis
and tests. A security adminlscrator is supported, audit
mechanisms are expanded to signal security - relevant events and
system recovery procedures are required.
The Pure Book (Trus_ed Network Evaluation Criteria) is expected
_o offer guidelines applicable to the PCEE model when £_ is
available. [6]
.
The Open Systems Incerconnection (OSI) Model provides standards
for che exchange of £nforma=ton among sys=ems thac are "open" ro
anocher for chis purpose by vircue of their mucual use of che
applicable s_:andards. A system is defined in =his in_erna¢ional
standard as it is in the PCEE Model, [9]
The purpose of the OSl Is to define a se_ of standards _o enable
open Systems _ to communlcate and c66pera_e, _ Ic uses a layered
archlteccure for operations such as intersyscem connecclons,
_ransmtsslon da_a and error functions. This model is mandated
for the design of a network operating system for the SSF.
A'8
Proposed £roCocype
Before proposing a security pro¢ocype effort, a study was made of
the above standards, the SERC PCEE model and the SSP
speclfLcatlons for a Data Management System (DHS). Careful uote
was made of DHS requirements that had security implications,
especiaily in safety critical components. Some of these
requirements are:
Override capability of automatic systems is required for
authorized onboard and ground crews.
A User Interface Executive must keep track Of which user is
linked _o which application tool.
Authorized emergency priority messages must be forwarded.
Command differentiation is _o be suitable for managing
operations and to protect the system from Inadvercenc
and unauthorized payload operations.
Local and remote access to onboard DHS databases must be
consistent with security and privacy practices.
To facilitate research for a multilevel secure system for the
Space Station, a minimal configuration for proof of concept for a
reconflgurable testbed is proposed to NASA. I_ has the following
characteristics and'c_ibilf_!es_ _ "
There will be a minimum of 3 local area networks (LANs), each
consisting of at least 3 clusters of processors. The LANs will
be geographically separated and communicate over a wide area
network (WAN) that is OSl compatible.
=
In each cluster in each LAN there will be a_ leas_ three
processors, all of which can co6perate in parallel processing
within the cluster.
There will be the capability of distributed, parallel processing
among the groups of LANs ....
There will be the capability of distributed, parallel processing
among the LANs in the wide area network (WAN).
A single, unified network operating system will be _he sum of _he
individual run time support environments in the clusters. It
will provide the follow_ng for the prototype;
A set of pollcLes for the managemen_ of servlces and
resources to be provided to the application programs.
The set of management m oduies co enforCe thepollcies.
A set of rules for modlf£catlon and extension.
This network will be able co support multlprogrammlng within and
among multlprocessors. That is, one processor will be able to
simultaneously handle more than one program and one program will
beable _o be executed with more than one processor. Also, there
will be the capability to have multlcasklng within a program and
across multiple programs and processors.
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Each cluster w£1[ be bull= upon =he c_elve components o_ ¢i_e SIS
of the Clear Lake Hodel for a PCEE and w_ll consist of a set of
components from these Eour classes:
Processors wlch shared access co memory subsystems
Memory subsystem wlch stable and volatile storage
Communication links CO ocher clusters
Sharable services and resources.
There will be a common sense of riming throughout the WAN. That
is, each system may have Its own =iming mechanism and
granularlcy, buc it must be able to interpret time scamps from
the ocher systems.
A PCEE written in Ada will be the only environment t'ype used in
the development of each component of each cluster. No untyped
language may be accessible co provide a trap door co the
operating system, hardware or ocher safety critical resources.
Hardware representation specifications will be restricted to
those individually approved and monl_ored by the security
admlnlstracor.
In order to control access to safety crlC£cal components, each
node will have only a PCEE-complianc operating system and access
only co PCEE-compllant tools. All user interfaces will be
through the PCEE only.
Code will be written in Ada Co demonstrate the scenarios in the
paper entitled "Access Control Model for a Distributed, CAIS-
Conforming System". It will include access control attributes
for each entity and approprla=e relationship in the system. It
will include programs to provide access control management for
Orange Book level B3 and beyond It will rely on the exlsclng
network, database and applications managemen_ routines in the
prototype systems.
Summary
yTheClear Lake Model _or a S stem !nterface Set of a Portable
Common Execution Environment is believed to fulfill the
requiremen_s for System Interface Sets thac protect the safety of
critical components of the Space Station orbiting, coorbiting and
ground systems and the interaction of these systems while
simultaneously supporting mission requirements. A dynamic,
multilevel security model has been designed as a parr of the PCEE
co assure access control of these safety critical components as
well as privacy Eor scientific or user-proprlecary data. A
prototype of the PCEE model has been proposed co NASA in order co
prove the concepts presented here.
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